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Principles of risk imposition and the
priority of avoiding harm
Gregory C. Keating
1  In one of his columns, the economist Paul Krugman remarked that “liberals don’t need to
claim that  their  policies  will  produce  spectacular  growth.  All  they  need  to  claim is
feasibility: that we can do things like, say, guaranteeing health insurance to everyone
without killing the economy.”1 Krugman’s belief  that providing everyone with health
insurance is desirable unless doing so would “kill  the economy” expresses a common
belief. Some goods should be provided to everyone, even if their provision comes at a cost
in  economic  efficiency.  The  goods  in  question  are  essential  to  leading  decent,
independent lives and their provision therefore has a special priority. Physical safety is,
like health,  a strong candidate for inclusion on a list  of the essential  conditions of a
decent and independent life. Accidental injury can impair basic powers of agency as much
as  poor  health  can.  Unsurprisingly,  assertions  that safety  has  priority  over  ordinary
“needs and interests” are commonplace in popular discourse. In commenting on self-
driving cars, for instance, the editors of Consumer Reports remark that they “support […]
any new technology that advances the needs and interests of consumers, but at CR, we’re
always going to make safety our priority.” 2 
2 Because safety has a claim to be an essential condition of effective agency one might
expect  to  find a  vigorous  debate  in  the legal  literature  on risk  and precaution over
whether or not safety should be prioritized over efficiency. Prominent federal statutes
take this very position, enjoining either that activities be made “safe” or requiring that
the risks of certain activities be reduced as far as it is “feasible” to do so. By “feasible”
they mean exactly what Krugman means. The risks in question should be reduced as far
as  possible  without  “killing  the  activity”  in  question.  A  chorus  of  contemporary
commentators insists, however, that there is no debate to be had. Safety- and feasibility-
based risk regulation are simply irrational. Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner, for example,
write that feasibility analysis “does not reflect deontological thinking ... [does not] reflect
welfarism in any straightforward sense,” and “no attempt to reverse engineer a theory of
well-being  that  justifies  feasibility  analysis  has  been  successful.”3 This  criticism  of
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feasibility analysis is a particular manifestation of a general thesis. Efficiency is the only
plausible standard of precaution, and its handmaiden cost-benefit analysis is “the only
game in town for determining appropriate standards of conduct for socially useful but
risky acts.”4 
3 Professors Masur and Posner’s skepticism that feasibility analysis is a serious alternative
to cost-benefit analysis, and Professor Fried’s assertion that cost-benefit analysis is the
only game in town when it comes to legal standards governing the appropriate level of
precaution,  are  hardly  outlier  opinions.  Cass  Sunstein,  easily  the  most  influential
American  legal  academic  now  writing  on  risk,  asserts  that  “[u]ncontroversial”
considerations  “suggest”  that  “[i]t  is  not  possible  to  do  evidence-based,  data-driven
regulation without assessing both costs and benefits, and without being as quantitative as
possible.”5 Cost-benefit  analysis is  indispensable to thinking rationally about risk and
regulation.6 Unless and until we embrace cost-benefit analysis, our thinking about risk
and precaution will be ruled by rank sentimentality and cognitive error. The most recent
Supreme Court decision on point asserts that—absent specific statutory instruction to the
contrary—regulatory agencies must engage in cost-benefit analysis the moment that they
contemplate regulating a harmful substance. It is irrational even to contemplate reducing
harm without considering costs.7
4 To be sure, these claims are sometimes developed in ways which are plausible. Early in
the  rise  of  law  and  economics  in  the  American  legal  academy,  for  example,  Guido
Calabresi  developed a capacious conception of  the mode of  analysis  which sought to
incorporate a whole range of values, and which sought to assign special weight to “justice
constraints.”8 For all of Calabresi’s influence and importance, however, in the American
legal academy law and economics has not followed in his footsteps. By the time Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell published their influential Fairness versus Welfare,9 the law and
economics community had largely coalesced around the idea that welfare is the master
value  and  efficiency  its  legal  expression.  Among  philosophers,  there  is  a  lively
philosophical  debate over whether contractualism—the most  prominent philosophical
alternative to consequentialism—can “make the numbers count” in the right way, or deal
adequately with cases where only future lives are put at risk.10 This philosophical debate,
however, has had almost no impact on discourse in law. Within the legal academy, the
claim that “cost-benefit” analysis is the “only game in town” is a way of saying that
welfare is the master value and efficiency, its handmaiden, is the master test. For all its
currency this claim is implausible. 
5 Cost-benefit  analysis, conventionally  conceived,  is  not  rationality  incarnate;  it  is
efficiency embodied. Cost-benefit analysis has its home in a framework which supposes
that welfare is the ultimate or master value and that promoting welfare is the proper end
of political and legal institutions. The distinctions among persons disappear because the
task of law and morality is to bring into existence states of the world in which there is as
much welfare as possible. Cost-justified precaution is efficient precaution. It prescribes
that risks to health and safety should be managed by minimizing the combined costs of
avoiding and suffering the illnesses and injuries in question, thereby maximizing the net
benefit that we extract from the activities responsible for the illnesses and injuries at
issue.  Acting efficiently is,  to be sure,  presumptively desirable.  Efficiency is a value—
something  whose  realization  is  presumptively  good—but  acting  efficiently  is  not
rationality incarnate. Efficiency is one value among many. Other values also bear on the
desirability of various risk-reducing measures. Precautions may be fair or unfair as well
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as efficient or inefficient; they may respect or disrespect people’s rights; they may enable
or disable desirable forms of choice; they be sensitive or insensitive to the distinctive
values realized by some activity (some sport or some line of work for instance); and so on.
6 Efficiency’s  relative  importance  as  a  value,  moreover,  is  debatable.  In  lay  language,
inefficiency is wastefulness. Wastefulness may be an intrinsically bad thing, but it is not
the worst thing in the world and its avoidance is not the best thing in the world. The
more precise articulation of waste avoidance as wealth-maximization is no doubt useful
to the economic analysis of legal regimes, but it does not transform the avoidance of
waste into a more important value. As Ronald Dworkin forcefully demonstrated decades
ago, wealth itself is not a value.11 Recognizing this, academic champions of efficiency have
come to defend wealth-maximization not as an important value in its own right, but as a
kind  of  false  target  for  welfare.  Wealth-maximization  is  the  proper  end  for  legal
institutions  to  pursue,  but  the  value  which  justifies  making  efficiency  the  master
criterion for evaluating most legal regimes is welfare.12 The best division of institutional
labor prescribes that legal institutions other than tax ought to maximize wealth, and the
tax system ought to (re)distribute wealth in the way prescribed by some preferred social
welfare function.13 Welfare, for its part, is taken to be not only a value, but the value.
Other things are good only insofar as they promote welfare.
7 The claim that welfare is the master value by which all laws and institutions are to be
measured  is  plausible,  but  it  is  hardly  uncontroversial.  Philosophical  and  political
liberalism have long denied that welfare is a master value, and have long asserted that
values are irreducibly plural.14 Liberalism supposes that people have their own, diverse
conceptions of happiness and that the pursuit of those conceptions is best left to persons
themselves. People, not the state, are primarily responsible for their own welfare. The
basic role of the state, on a liberal view, is to establish the institutional and material
conditions of effective agency so that people may pursue happiness as they conceive it.
On a liberal view, securing the conditions of effective agency is a matter of justice, and
the claims of justice have priority over the claims of efficiency. This is hardly a novel
thought. Indeed, the most prominent liberal theory of justice in the twentieth century
has made it famous. 
8 Safety is not a prominent subject of famous theories of justice but it is a natural candidate
for special priority. We regard safety as a prima facie or pro tanto value. We don’t need to
invoke efficiency to explain why we want our cars, our schools, our air and our drinking
water to be safe. Safety secures the physical and psychological integrity of the person and
that integrity is  a  precondition of  effective agency.  Safety thus has a claim to being
especially  important,  and  its  special  importance  presumably  means  that  it  is  worth
securing at some cost in economic efficiency. Because our legal and political discourse is
divided  between  competing  moral  conceptions—so  that  efficiency  is  not  universally
regarded as the master value for all law and public policy—it is surprising to be told that
cost-benefit analysis is the only game in town. Cost-benefit analysis expresses one point
of  view,  not  the  only  possible  point  of  view.  Philosophical  and  political  liberalism
expresses another point of view and its point of view gives us presumptive reason to
suppose that standards of precaution should prioritize safety.  Moreover,  standards of
precaution other than cost-benefit analysis are common in our law. Federal statutory
standards governing health, environmental and safety regulation often insist that some
activity  be  made  “safe,”  or  that  some  risks  be  reduced  to  the  point  where  further
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reduction would be “infeasible.” The only question is whether the theory supports our
practices. 
9 Champions of cost-benefit analysis are correct on their own terms. Within the framework
of cost-benefit  analysis,  taking more than cost-justified precaution is flatly irrational.
However high a price we set on avoiding serious physical injury, illness, and premature
death we should still trade the benefits of averting those harms off against the costs of
obtaining them in a way which maximizes benefit and minimizes costs. When we press
beyond the point of cost-justified precaution, the cost of avoiding harm is greater than
the benefit of doing so. Taking more than efficient precaution makes us less wealthy. That
squandering of wealth leads inexorably to a diminution in social welfare. 
10 
These terms, however, are debatable. In insisting that all good and bad things are fungible
at some ratio of exchange and that rationality consists in maximizing value, cost-benefit
analysis contradicts our common sense moral convictions by rejecting the proposition
that the avoidance of harm does and should have special priority.15 The asymmetry of
harm and benefit is a firmly entrenched feature of both our moral intuitions and our law.
Non-consequentialist  moral  theory  lends  support  to  our  moral  convictions  and legal
commitments.  Broadly  speaking,  the  conflict  is  between  an  economic  version  of
consequentialism and legal norms which express deontological commitments.
11 The supposition “at the heart of deontological (or non-consequentialist)” moral theory is
that the “‘subject matter of morality is not what we should bring about, but how we
should relate to one another.’”16 On such a view both the distinction between persons and
the relations among persons are central.  The fundamental  moral  questions posed by
issues of risk and precaution are questions about what people owe to each other, both in
way of freedom to impose risks of harm on others in the pursuit of their own ends, and in
the way of precaution against risks of harm imposed upon them by other people going
about their own business. Questions about risk and precaution are questions about the
terms on which risks may be imposed by some and on others. The claims of persons
(abstractly  conceived  as  representative  members  of  classes  of  potential  injurers  and
victims) come to the fore. Putting persons and their essential interests as agents in the
moral foreground casts the harm-benefit asymmetry in a favorable light. When we focus
on the essential conditions of effective agency, harms and benefits are not symmetrically
important. Physical harms—death, disability, disease, and the like—rob us of normal and
foundational powers of action. They are bad for us no matter what our ends. Few benefits,
by contrast, comparably augment our basic powers of agency. The value of a benefit turns
on whether it does or does not further the ends of the person in question. This a more
contingent  matter.  Extraordinary hand-eye  coordination is  indispensable  for  an elite
tennis player but largely wasted on a law professor. Unsought benefits, moreover, usually
diminish our autonomy by imposing upon us. Benefits thrust upon us in the name of our
own welfare can be positively disempowering. 
12 Because serious physical harm severely impairs basic powers of human agency, whereas
most benefits do not comparably enhance our powers of agency, we have reason to assign
special priority to the avoidance of harm. Because deontology takes persons and their
claims against one another as fundamental, and because liberal deontology makes the
conditions of effective agency a concern of the state, the framework brings the special
badness of harm into focus. Physical harm is something that befalls particular persons. It
is presumptively and especially bad for them because it cripples capacities and powers on
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which the pursuit of all of their ends depend. The welfarist underpinnings of cost-benefit
analysis, by contrast, obscure harm’s special significance because they treat harm as just
another cost in an overall social calculus. Our law is torn between standards of cost-
justified precaution and norms of safe and feasible precaution because our law is torn
between two moral outlooks. 
13 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 summarizes the three standards of precaution
and  the  differences  that  divide  them.  Section  2  focuses  on  the  importance  of  the
distinction between persons and the harm-benefit asymmetry, elaborating on the points
made  in  the  preceding  paragraphs.  In  addition  to  treating  costs  and  benefits  as
symmetrically important, cost-benefit analysis models social choice on individual choice.
This commitment, too, is problematic. When some people have their lives devastated by
harms issuing out of risk impositions— while others profit from the imposition of those
very same risks—it is a mistake to model social choice on individual choice. We must take
the distinction between persons seriously and adopt principles which are justifiable from
the  standpoints  of  both  the  potential  victims  and  the  potential  beneficiaries  of  the
practices  in question.  When physical  harm is  at  issue,  treating costs  and benefits  as
symmetrically important fails to register the values at stake. 
 
1 Three standards of precaution
14 In legal discourse, the claim that cost-benefit analysis is the only plausible way to think
about  risk  and  precaution  is  articulated  as  a  criticism  of  two  other  standards  of
precaution—namely,  the  “safe  level”  and  “feasibility”  standards.17 Federal  statutory
standards governing health, environmental and safety regulation often insist that some
activity  be  made  “safe,”  or  that  some  risk  be  reduced  to  the  point  where  further
reduction would be “infeasible.” The regulation of air,  food,  and water quality is  the
principal habitat of the “safe-level” standard, and the regulation of occupational health
and safety is the principal habitat of the feasibility standard. The three standards identify
distinct  levels  of  permissible  risk imposition.  Normally,  they stand in linear,  vertical
relation to one another, with the safety standard tolerating the least risk and the cost-
justification standard tolerating the most.18 
 
1.1 Safe, feasible and cost-justified precaution
15 The two standards of most interest to us—the safety and feasibility standards—deploy a
relatively  well-integrated set  of concepts.  The concepts  of  “safe  level,”  “feasible  risk
reduction” and “significant” risk that form the core of both statutory standards are terms
of art. The feasibility standard, for its part, is further broken down into technological and
economic prongs. The legal regimes that the standards establish need to be understood in
terms of these concepts; in relation to one another; in relation to the idea of cost-justified
risk reduction; and in light of their usual domains of application. 
 
1.1.1 The safe-level standard
16 The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 embodies the safe-level standard.19 It requires
that pesticide residue on fresh and processed foods be reduced to a “safe” level.20 “Safe,”
in turn, means “there is reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate
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exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including all dietary exposures and all other
exposures.”21 This standard is made even more stringent by instructions to regulators to
set  limits  that  provide  for  an  additional  margin  of  safety  in  light  of  the  special
susceptibility of infants and children to harm from toxic substances.22 Pesticide residue
on food is thus acceptable only to the extent that it is reasonably certain to harm no one
—not  even  those  unusually  vulnerable  to  harm.  Applying  the  safe-level  standard
therefore does not require any inquiry into the costs of risk reduction. All that it requires
is a determination of the level at which the risk created by exposure to the regulated
substance ceases to be significant.
17 Among the three standards, the safe-level standard tolerates the least risk. Safety-based
regulations  require  risk  to  be  reduced  to  a  point  where no  “significant  risk”  of
devastating  injury  remains.  This  may  well  require  moving  beyond the  point  of  cost-
justified  precaution  (and  beyond  the  point  of  feasible  precaution,  too).  If  efficient
precaution is taken and significant risk still  remains, the safe level standard requires
further reduction.23 The standard may therefore require precaution that presses beyond
the point of maximum net benefit, as cost-benefit analysis conceives that point. 
 
1.1.2 The feasibility standard
18 The feasibility standard is at least as salient in federal risk regulation as the “safe-level”
standard.  The Clean Air  Act,  for  example,  provides  that  standards  for  hazardous  air
pollutants “shall require the maximum degree of reduction in emissions” that the EPA,
“taking into consideration the cost of achieving such emission reduction” determines to
be  “achievable.”24 Feasible  risk  reduction  does  not  require  the  elimination  of  all
significant risk. It is less stringent than the safety standard, but generally more stringent
than cost-justified precaution. Feasible precaution calls for reducing an activity’s risks as
far  as  possible  consistent  with  the  long-term  flourishing  of  the  activity.  Because  it
requires that significant risks be reduced until either (1) they are insignificant, or (2)
further reduction would jeopardize the long-run health of the activity whose risks they
are, feasible risk reduction may require pressing precaution beyond the point where a
dollar more spent on the prevention of harm yields more than a dollar’s worth of harm
prevented, and to the point where further risk reduction would endanger the activity. 
 
1.1.3 The cost-benefit standard and its claims
19 The basic idea of cost-justified risk imposition is easy to state, perhaps deceptively so.
Cost-justified precaution requires risks to be reduced to the point where the costs of
further  precautions  exceed  their  benefits.  Cost  and  benefit,  for  their  part,  are  all-
encompassing concepts. In a well-known defense of cost-benefit analysis, the economist
Robert Solow explained that “the cost of the good thing to be obtained is precisely the
good thing that must or will be given up to obtain it.”25 “Cost,” then, is anything given up
to obtain something else. “Benefit” is the flip side of the coin—anything worth attaining
whose attainment requires giving something up. An ideal cost-benefit analysis takes all
costs and all benefits into account and identifies the point at which costs and benefits are
balanced so that net benefit is maximized. In practice, almost all cost-benefit analyses
take more restricted sets of costs and benefits into account. In the context of accidental
injury,  for  example,  the  criterion  of  cost-justification  is  usually  said  to  require
minimizing the “sum of precaution, accidental harm, and administration costs.”26 For
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present purposes it will do to say that cost-justified precaution holds that risk should be
reduced to the point of maximum net benefit, economically conceived. That point is the
point at which a dollar more spent avoiding harm yields less than a dollar’s worth of
harm avoided.  In general,  cost-justified precaution is  the least stringent of  the three
standards of precaution. 
 
1.2 Do the standards really identify different levels of precaution?
20 The safety and feasibility standards were born in the 1960s and 70s, in the last great
flowering of liberal legal reform. They were and are championed by political liberals.
They have their roots in the founding of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970
and the Occupational  Health and Safety Administration in 1971.  They dominated the
regulatory  landscape  into  the  1980s,  and  they  received  important  legislative
reaffirmation during the 1990s—as the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 itself shows.27
Early in the 1980s, however, the political right began championing cost-benefit analysis
and  cost-justified  precaution  as  its  preferred  alternative  to  safe  and  feasible  risk-
reduction. In 1982, the Reagan Administration put into place an executive order requiring
cost-benefit  analysis  for  all  “significant”  federal  regulations  unless  conducting  such
analysis was prohibited by law—if,  for example,  the authorizing statute itself  forbade
consideration of cost.28 Since the early 1980s the two approaches have been engaged in a
prolonged tussle.
21 This tussle is worth continuing only if the standards really do identify different levels of
required precaution. It is plain from what has been said so far that the standards express
different normative judgments. The following examples show, I hope, that these three
standards identify different levels of precaution in important cases. The circumstances to
which the safety, feasibility and cost-justification standards apply in the examples that I
have chosen differ from the circumstances contemplated by federal health and safety
statutes  in  some ways.  The  differences  in circumstances  of  application,  however,  no
doubt  has  its  disadvantages,  but  it  also  has  an  advantage.  The  three  standards  of
precaution are discernible across domains, notwithstanding the ways in which they are
reshaped by the demands of  different institutional  domains.  Their  persistence across
diverse contexts suggests that the normative convictions they express are robust. 
 
1.2.1 The safety standard: consumer expectations
22 In the United States, the two most common tests of product design defectiveness are the
risk-utility test and the consumer-expectation test. Law and economics scholars usually
take the risk-utility test to be an application of cost-benefit analysis to product design.29
By contrast, in some applications, the consumer-expectation test works as a “safe-level”
standard. Whereas the risk-utility test focuses on product design from the perspective of
a product engineer, the consumer-expectation test focuses on product performance from
the perspective of the user. Sometimes people expect products to be safe—not perfect,
but safe. And sometimes a product which passes muster under the risk-utility test is not
safe.  Green  v.  Smith  &  Nephew AHP,  Inc., illustrates  this  kind of  circumstance  nicely.30
Plaintiff Green worked as a medical technologist in a hospital. 
Her job required her to wear protective gloves while attending patients, up to 40
pairs of  gloves per shift.  She wore powdered latex gloves manufactured by [the
defendant. After a period of prolonged use] Green experienced increasingly severe
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health problems – cold-like symptoms, wide-spread rash, acute shortness of breath.
She was hospitalized four times. In 1991 Green was diagnosed with latex allergy.
Given her allergy, Green must avoid contact with latex. So she had to change jobs
and must limit the items she buys, things she eats, and activities she pursues. On
account of the allergy, Green developed asthma.31
23 Exposure to latex proteins “sensitizes” some people to latex. Subsequent exposure of a
sensitized person to latex may produce progressively worse allergic reactions including
irreversible asthma and life-threatening anaphylactic shock (which Green suffered). Since
latex allergy is caused mainly by use of latex gloves, it disproportionately afflicts health
care workers. According to the evidence that Green put on at trial, the frequency of latex
allergy among health care workers in the United States is 5 to 17 percent. At the time that
Green became sensitized to latex the medical community was unaware of the possibility
of latex allergy. Because latex allergy was unknown until the use of latex gloves became
widespread, if Green’s claim were judged by the risk-utility test it would most likely have
failed.32 The cost of discovering the defectiveness of latex gloves years before that defect
manifested itself in health injuries to regular users was surely high. Indeed, it might have
been impossible to discover the hazardous effects of long-term use of latex gloves in any
way other than through widespread use of such gloves over a prolonged period of time. 
24 When Wisconsin evaluated the gloves under the consumer expectation test, however, the
plaintiff’s  claim  prevailed.  The  consumer-expectation  test  measures  product
defectiveness by asking if a product is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be  contemplated  by  the  ordinary  consumer.”33 That  defendant’s  latex  gloves  were
defective  under  the  expectation  test  seemed  self-evident  to  the  court. The  users  of
defendant’s gloves reasonably expected that they would not suffer injury from normal
use  of  the  product.  Consequently,  the  court  did  not  bother  to  state  the  relevant
expectation precisely.34 It does not seem difficult, however, to do so. All of us reasonably
expect  that  wearing  ordinary  clothing  will  not  put  us  at  significant  risk  of  serious
physical harm. Analogously, health care workers in Green’s position reasonably expect
that wearing protective gear would not put them at significant risk of disabling physical
harm. 
25 Generalizing, we may say that clothing is a simple and familiar example of a product that
we normally expect to be safe. In saying that, we mean that we believe that the clothes we
ordinarily  wear  do  not  put  us  at  significant  risk  of  physical  harm.  The  question  of
whether this expectation is cost-justified never arises. 
 
1.2.2 The feasibility standard: rescues
26  The literature on “statistical lives” is haunted by the apparent irrationality of many
rescues.35 Money seems no object when miners are trapped in a mine, or when children
are trapped in a burning building. From an economic perspective this seems foolish and
extravagant. The rational way to budget our “rescue money” is to spend it in the way
which maximizes the number of lives saved with the least sacrifice of other objectives.
Lives are lives and the extra money spent rescuing identified persons might be better
spent  on  safety  measures  that  would  save  more  lives.  This,  of  course,  is  simply  an
application of the standard argument for cost-justified precaution to the special case of
rescues.36 When actual lives are endangered, however, we think it would be unseemly,
and probably morally wrong, to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the value of the lives
at stake and the cost of saving them. We rescue the victims if we can, and rescuers often
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take  great  risks  upon  themselves  in  the  course  of  rescues  and  attempted  rescues.37
Generally speaking, our rescue practices appear to be governed by a norm of feasibility
not by a norm of efficiency. A particularly striking case in point is the military tradition
of undertaking rescues to recover the corpses of slain soldiers. In the introduction to his
book on the American war in Vietnam, Philip Caputo observed: 
Two  friends  of  mine  died  trying  to  save  the corpses  of  their  men  from  the
battlefield. Such devotion, simple and selfless, the sentiment of belonging to each
other, was the one decent thing in a conflict noted for its monstrosities.38
27 It is hard to believe that the actions Caputo so admires were cost-justified. Losing a life to
save a corpse seems like a bad trade. But it also seems correct to say that the economic
mind  set  of  cost-benefit  analysis  is  out  of  place  here.  There  is  something  morally
grotesque about trying to figure out if losing one’s life trying to rescue a corpse is a
potential Pareto-improvement or not. Rescuing the bodies of one’s fallen comrades is
about solidarity and sacrifice, not about improving one’s own welfare. It is about the
realization of values taken to be of paramount importance. Therein lies its rationality. 
28 The rescue of corpses on the battlefield is, of course, an extreme example, but it teaches
important  lessons  about  less  extreme  cases.  For  one  thing,  all  rescues  involve  the
affirmation of a common value. Solidarity is word—and the value—that comes to mind.
The  plight  of  trapped  miners  differs  from the  plight  of  fallen  comrades,  but  it  too
implicates solidarity. We are all vulnerable to accidents and premature death. Honoring
the  value  of  solidarity  does  not  deny  the  value  of  efficiency;  it  merely  asserts  that
solidarity matters more in the general context of rescues. In the very special context of
the military, solidarity is even more important. The goods intrinsic to military excellence
can only be realized if solidarity is valued very highly. There is nothing irrational about
this. It is eminently rational to believe that some very valuable human goods cannot be
realized unless we recognize that “no man is an island,” and when the bell tolls for one of
us, it tolls for all of us. 
29 It  is,  no doubt,  romantic to extend the ideal  of  solidarity from the battlefield to the
ordinary workplace, but it is also a mistake not to recognize that even military rescues
are governed by a standard of feasibility. It is heroic to attempt to recover the bodies of
your fallen comrades only if there is some chance of succeeding. Without that possibility,
an attempted rescue may be foolish or tragic (or both), but it is not noble or heroic.
Rescue is governed by a norm of possibility. 
 
1.2.3 Cost-justification and commensurability: private necessity
30 The flip side of the coin that cost-justified precaution is not the proper principle for
regulating serious harms to persons is that the criterion of cost-justification is a proper
criterion for regulating harm to goods which are fungible and replaceable. The doctrine
of private necessity, articulated in the famous case of Vincent v. Lake Erie, illustrates this
point nicely.39 There are two issues in Vincent. The first is whether the ship owner should
be  given a  privilege  to  tie  up  at  the  plaintiff’s  dock  in  order  to  avoid  near  certain
destruction at the hands of a sudden and fierce winter storm. The second is whether such
a privilege should be conditional. If the privilege is conditional, the defendant must make
good any harm that it does to plaintiff’s dock in the course of saving its ship. The court
answers both questions affirmatively. 
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31 Vincent is a case where efficient precaution is the proper standard of precaution. The dock
and the ship are fungible pieces of property. Their value is their use or consumption
value. Moreover, the metric of money is well-suited to measuring both the damage done
by bashing the dock and the damage avoided by keeping the ship out of the storm. The
rational  course  of  action  in  Vincent is  to  minimize  combined  harm  and  maximize
combined benefit. Additionally, the question of who should bear the cost of the ship’s
salvation—the ship owner or the dock owner—can be addressed after the harm has been
done. The court concluded (rightly, I think) that fairness required the ship owner to bear
the costs of its ship’s salvation. That fair distribution could be effected after the dock was
damaged simply by requiring the defendant to pay appropriate money damages to the
plaintiff. As we shall see, matters are different when serious harm to persons is involved
because such harm is not fully repairable. Fairness must be done ex ante. 
32 The standards applied in these examples value the avoidance of harm differently. The
application  of  the  consumer-expectation  test  to  latex  gloves  in  Green is  the  most
stringent.  Significant risk  of  harm to  normal  users  is  unacceptable.  Latex  gloves  are
defective because they precipitate severe allergic reactions in a significant number of
users. By contrast, the basic commitment of the feasibility standard in rescue cases is save
life if it is possible to do so. The norm of cost-justification, implicit in Vincent, assigns no
priority  to  avoiding  harm.  It  trades  harm  off  against  other  goods  in  a  way  which
maximizes net benefit. In short, the safety standard insists on the lowest level of risk; the
cost-justification standard accepts the highest level; and the feasibility standard falls in
the middle. None of the standards insists on absolute safety. All three standards specify
permissible tradeoffs. They vary significantly, however, in the tradeoffs that they license.
 
2 Normative commitments
2.1 The use value of persons
33 Let us return to, and retrace, earlier points. For our purposes, the important issue is not
exactly how cost-benefit  analysis is  practiced,  but why the cost-justified level  of  risk
imposition is claimed to be the correct level of risk imposition. The argument is simple.
When we minimize the combined costs of preventing accidental harms (precaution costs)
and paying for those harms that we do not prevent (accident costs), we maximize net
benefit  (benefit  minus cost).  We diminish net  benefit  if  we take either  more or  less
precaution. If we take more precaution, the increased marginal spending on precaution
costs exceeds the increased marginal savings in accident costs. If we take less precaution,
the  marginal  savings  in  precaution  costs  are  exceeded by  the  marginal  increases  in
accident costs. This is why law and economics scholars like Masur and Posner conceive of
the cost-justified level of precaution as the rational level of precaution. The safety and
feasibility norms are fundamentally irrational because they prescribe inefficient levels of
precaution. Safety may be precious but it comes at a cost and its value is not infinite. The
benefits of achieving a particular level of safety must therefore be traded off against the
costs of doing so. The rational way to trade costs off against benefits is to balance them so
that we maximize net value and thereby make ourselves as well  off  as we can be. 40
Pressing precaution beyond the point  of  cost-justification yields  less  value not  more
value. Preferring less value to more value is simply illogical.41
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34 This claim is sometimes presented as a matter of mere common sense,42 but it is in fact
the child of a theory. That theory is deeply intuitive in some contexts and a profound
affront to our considered convictions in others. Cost-benefit analysis of risks to health
and safety is an attempt to extend a market mode of valuation and choice to areas where
actual  markets  fail—where actual  markets  either do not  exist  or  are incomplete and
imperfect. By name, there are no markets in people’s lives, and the markets that do exist
are, at best, badly incomplete.43 Even so, we might think about risks to life, in market
terms.  Indeed,  Thomas  Schelling  founded  the  modern  approach  to  the  valuation  of
human life by observing that we can view the question of “what it is worth to reduce the
risk of death” as a “consumer choice.”44 “We nearly all want our lives extended and are
probably willing to pay for it.”45 Schelling was quite right to point out both that we can do
this and that doing so seems quite natural and appropriate in many contexts.  In the
context of purchasing a new car, for example, it seems eminently sensible to ask if some
new safety device is worth its cost, or if our money would be better spent elsewhere. 
35 When we think of  risk and precaution as “consumer choices” we compare costs and
benefits and seek to maximize net benefits. Pricing various costs and benefits makes our
thinking more rigorous and precise, as long as it can be done credibly. Moreover, we can
proceed this way not only when we are making individual decisions, but also when we are
making collective ones. In deciding whether or not some automobile safety improvement
—backup  cameras  which  avert  a  certain  number  of  deaths  per  year,  say—is  worth
installing, we can construct a value of life figure (e.g., $5,000,000), and then estimate how
many lives the safety device would save.46 That benefit—the monetary value of the lives
saved—is then compared to the cost of the safety device to see if the installation of the
safety device is net beneficial or not. Conceptually, the lives of potential victims (ideally,
as  valued by the victims themselves)  are  commodities,  legitimate  objects  of  use  and
consumption. Lives are goods whose value is determined by what people (including those
people whose lives they are) are willing to pay for them; they are properly exchanged for
other goods at appropriate rates of exchange; and they are properly sacrificed when the
cost of saving a life exceeds the benefit doing so.
36 This  extension  of  the  consumer  choice  model  from  individual  to  social  decision  is,
however, far from innocuous. A market conception of value assumes that everything has
a price—explicitly or implicitly47— and that the value of everything is its price. On a market
conception of value, prices are not an attempt to track the inherent value of the goods
priced. On the contrary, value is conferred by the preferences for which prices are proxies.
Prices reflect the value that would-be purchasers place on goods. Things with prices,
moreover, are all substitutable for one another at some ratio of exchange. “[E]conomics …
envisages rational man as seeking many goals, all substitutable at the margin. On the
margin, economic man is prepared to trade off some freedom for some security, some
privacy for some wealth, some freedom for some paternalism, and vice versa”.48 There is
always some rate of exchange at which a rational person is willing to accept less of some
good in exchange for more of another. By extension, there is always a rate of exchange at
which a rational society, economically conceived, is prepared to trade off the life of one of
its members for enough of some other good. The value of everything is its price and
everything that we might gain or lose when we impose risks on one another is fungible at
the right price. 
37 Practitioners of cost-benefit analysis are often quick to acknowledge that the conceptual
and practical problems of pricing lives and other nonmarket goods are substantial. The
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normative implausibility of assuming that human lives are goods whose value is properly
fixed by a price mechanism are less frequently noted. Yet it is surely counter-intuitive
normatively to assert that people’s lives have no intrinsic value, and that the only value
persons have is the value conferred by expressed demand to use and consume their lives.
The assumption of fungibility is equally counter-intuitive. We regard our lives as distinct
from each other’s, and as unique. 
38 The safety and feasibility standards make sense only against the backdrop of a different
conception of  value and justification.  The natural  habitat  of  those norms is  a  moral
outlook which recognizes the intrinsic value of  persons;  which takes the distinctions
between persons and the relations among them as fundamental; and which denies the
fungibility of lives both with each other and with an indefinite list of other goods. From
one angle, this denial rests on a claim about people’s interests. The safety and feasibility
standards presume that the people have an especially urgent interest in safety, because
the physical integrity of one’s person is an essential precondition of effective agency and
a decent life. From another, more illuminating, angle, the safety and feasibility standards
rest on an assertion about value. That conception of value has more in common with
Kant’s famous claim that rational beings have dignity and that beings which have dignity
are  “above all  price,  and therefore  [admit]  of  no  equivalent”.49 than it  does  with  the
conception of value implicit in cost-benefit analysis. 
39 The claim that rational beings are “above all  price” is a senseless statement from an
economic point of view.50 Kant’s point, though, is not that life has infinite value within an
economic framework but that we should not understand the value of rational agency in
economic  terms.  Within  the  price  system,  value  is  conferred  by  the  expression  of
preferences through the medium of money. Prices reflect use or consumption value to
would-be users and consumers. Nothing—not the Mona Lisa, not the right to vote, not
persons themselves—has intrinsic value. In a market, the “price” of a person’s life is fixed
by the demand of others for that life and the cost to the person whose life it is of giving it
up. The objection to this mode of valuation is that human lives have intrinsic value by
virtue of their rational nature and we must treat them accordingly. Persons are ends in
themselves, not objects of consumption for others. Their lives command respect. Unlike
commodities,  human  lives  are  neither  available  for  consumption  by  others,  nor
interchangeable at an appropriate rate of exchange. Each of us has only one life to live.
From our separate perspectives, other people’s lives are not substitutable for our own.
Because human lives are unique and command respect, it is a mistake to govern risks to
human life by the metric of the market. Respecting the distinctive value of human lives is
a desideratum that acceptable principles of risk imposition must meet. 
40 One way of articulating the demands imposed by the intrinsic (rational) value of human
lives is to say that it requires treating people “only in ways that would be allowed by
principles  that  they  could  not  reasonably  reject  insofar  as  they,  too,  were  seeking
principles of  mutual  governance which other rational  creatures could not reasonably
reject.”51 This is a demanding standard of justice, and it may be that none of our non-ideal
norms of risk regulation can meet this standard. Even so, it provides a backdrop against
which we can understand the safety and feasibility standards as plausible attempts to
articulate reasonable terms of risk imposition. 
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2.2 From efficiency to fairness
41 Implicit in both Thomas Schelling’s observation that we can view the question of “what it
is worth to reduce the risk of death” as a “consumer choice,” and in his general thesis
that “the life you save may be your own,” is an invitation to think about matters of risk
and precaution not only in the mode of market valuation but also as individual choices.52
Consider  the  purchase  of  a  new  car.  It  seems  perfectly  prudent  for  a  prospective
purchaser  to  evaluate  the  desirability  of  purchasing  an  optional  accident  avoidance
system by comparing the value of the accidents avoided to the value of the other goods
one might purchase with the money it costs to add the option. In other cases, however,
treating safety decisions as wholly individual would strike us as wildly inappropriate.
Imagine for example, a peculiar person who is attracted to the idea of exposing himself to
the level of risk involved in climbing K2, but utterly averse to the pain, suffering and
intense exertion of Himalayan mountaineering. To tailor his life to his special taste for
both risk and indolence, he hits on the idea of rigging up his car with an external gas tank
so that even a minor fender bender might prove fatal. Because this way of pursuing his
preferences for his own life seriously endangers others, it is implausible to think that the
matter should be settled solely by reference to his  peculiar  preferences for risk and
exertion. 
42 The cost-benefit analysis of risk of death is far from indifferent to the distinction between
these cases. It is keenly aware that the second case involves a major negative externality,
whereas the first does not. But it responds to the difference between them in a distinctive
way.  Cost-benefit  analysis  instructs  us  to  think  about  circumstances  where  some
individuals’ actions negatively impact the lives of others by incorporating the benefits to
some and the costs to others into a single calculus or risk and benefit. In doing so, cost-
benefit  analysis  models  social  decision  on  an  intuitively  appealing  conception  of
individual rationality. In many circumstances, the prudent thing for each of us to do is to
balance the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action and choose the action that
is most net-beneficial. The extension of this conception to the circumstances of social
choice,  where costs  and benefits  fall  on different  people,  is  much less  attractive.  By
combining all costs and all benefits into a single calculus of risk, cost-benefit analysis
eclipses “the distinction between persons.”53 
43 When we take the distinction between persons seriously, the proper test of principles of
risk imposition becomes not whether they maximize net benefit, but whether they are
justifiable to those whose lives they govern.  More particularly,  taking the distinction
between  persons  seriously  in  the  context  of  accidental  risk  imposition  directs  our
attention  not  to  overall  welfare,  but  to  equal  rights  and  interpersonal  fairness.  As
important recent work in private law theory has insisted,54 persons have a deep and
fundamental right to their own bodies. With respect to their own bodies, persons are
sovereign and the relations with others must be matters of equal rights. Each of us is the
lord of our physical persons and equally so. This idea of persons as small-scale sovereigns
applies directly to rights whose nature is to give persons control over prized zones of
discretion, as the tort of trespass gives the owners of real private property control over
who  enters  onto  their  land.  When  risk  impositions  are  stake,  however,  the  idea  of
individual sovereignty cannot be so directly applied. Risk imposition is irreducibly social.
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In the modern world especially, risks are the inevitable byproducts of basic productive
activities. 
44 Consequently, notwithstanding important libertarian arguments to the contrary,55 risk
imposition cannot be governed by a norm of individual consent. Unlike normal entries
onto real property, exposure to the risks imposed by others is normally involuntary. It is
a fact of social life as we know it. Risk impositions must, therefore, be governed by a norm
of interpersonal fairness. The terms on which risks are imposed must be justifiable to
both those who impose them and those upon whom they are imposed, when each of these
is understood as classes and articulated as the idea that principles of risk imposition must
be justified from the basic “standpoints” of those affected.56 Fairness comes to the fore
because equal rights to the liberty and integrity of one’s person are at stake and those
rights  must  be  reconciled—fairly.  Contractualism  develops  the  idea  of  fairness  in  a
particular way, a way in which ideas such as hypothetical agreement and justifiability to
each affected standpoint play central roles. For present purposes it will do to understand
fairness in a more general way—as a distinct domain of political morality, different from
both the domain of rights and the domain of efficiency. Efficiency is primarily concerned
with  overall  welfare;  rights  are  primarily  concerned  with  the  claims  of  individual
persons. Fairness is concerned with the distribution of burdens and benefits—“with how
well each person’s claim is satisfied compared with how well other people’s [claims] are
satisfied.”57 Here, the claims are claims of equal right. Fairness looms large when the
imposition of risk is at issue, both because we cannot make the terms of risk imposition a
matter of individual consent and because risk impositions pit the claims of those who
impose the risks and stand to benefit from them against those who are exposed to and
endangered by those risks. Treating people fairly generally requires us to align burden
and benefit proportionally.
45 In thinking about the fair distribution of risk, precaution and harm, it is important to
distinguish between harms that are repairable and those that are not. When harms are
fully repairable, as they are in Vincent v Lake Erie, we can achieve efficiency ex ante and
fairness ex post. Damaging the dock to save the ship is efficient; it minimizes the total
property damage done by the storm. Requiring reparation after the fact is fair; the ship
owner who benefits from saving the ship also bears the cost of its salvation. Matters are
different  when  the  harms  suffered  by  one  individual  are  serious  and  irreparable
impairments of normal agency, and even death. Fairness cannot be achieved after these
risks have ripened into injury. It must be done ex ante, by ensuring that the terms on
which  the  risks  in  question  are  imposed  are  justifiable  to  those  on  whom they  are
imposed. When the burdens of risk imposition are borne by some people in the form of
serious, irreparable harm, and the benefits of imposing those risks are reaped by others,
the distinction between persons looms especially large. A single person may rationally
choose to bear some burden to achieve an end she values. It is eminently rational for a
single person to settle on a level of precaution that maximizes her net benefit, ex ante. A
plurality of distinct persons, however, lacks the unity necessary to make the imposition
of significant harm on one person straightforwardly offset by the conferral of benefits on
other people. 
46 When risk imposition is interpersonal, risks of severe, irreparable injury ripen into harms
which  devastate  the  lives  of  some  people  while  the  activities  responsible  for  those
injuries redound to the benefit other people. This inequity cannot be justified by treating
benefits to some and devastating harms to others as if they were benefits and harms
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being borne by the same individual and maximizing overall benefit to the population as a
whole. The gains to some may be insufficient to justify the harms to others. Reasonable
principles of risk imposition must be justifiable both to those who stand to gain and to
those who stand to lose. Reasonable principles of risk imposition seek to safeguard the
essential conditions of rational agency for every person, so far as possible. Securing such
protection may well conflict with promoting overall welfare. The claims of those whose
lives  are  at  risk  of  accidental  destruction  and  devastation  at  the  hands  of  valuable
activities may require that those who reap the benefits of the risky activities at issue to
accept standards of safety which require more than efficient precaution. The safety and
feasibility principles address risks which ripen into harms which inflict enduring and
incurable impairment on those they injure. Their justification lies in the strength of the
claims  that  those  who  stand  to  suffer  such  injuries  have,  and  in  the  priority  we
reasonably place on the avoidance of harm. 
 
2.3 Autonomy and the asymmetry of harm and benefit
47 Harm has no special significance in cost-benefit analysis, and its avoidance has no special
priority. Harm is just one possible cost in a calculus of cost and benefit, and costs and
benefits are minuses and pluses on the same scale. “From an abstract perspective there
would seem to be little reason for harms and benefits to be treated differently. Decades of
cost-benefit analyses suggest that the two categories are interchangeable: reducing by
one dollar damage that would otherwise occur is equivalent to providing a dollar’s worth
of new goods or services.”58 This claim of symmetry is true to cost-benefit analysis, but at
odds with our ordinary intuitions and our law. In both morality and law our obligations to
avoid harming others  are  stronger  than our  obligations  to  benefit  them.  We can be
compelled to refrain from battering our neighbors, but we cannot be compelled either to
love  or  to  help  them.  Tort  is  robust  whereas  restitution  is  anemic.  The  American
Constitution contains a taking clause, but not a “givings” clause. 
 
2.3.1 Autonomy and asymmetry
48 For  cost-benefit  analysis,  the  harm-benefit  asymmetry  is  a  puzzle  at  best  and  an
irrationality at worst. If avoiding a dollar’s worth of damage “is equivalent to providing a
dollar’s worth of new goods or services,” then we ought to treat harms and benefits
symmetrically.59 If we take off the lenses of cost-benefit analysis, however, we can see the
sense in the asymmetry. Harm is a morally- freighted word. It is presumptively wrong to
harm someone and presumptively bad to suffer harm. In most circumstances, it is not
presumptively wrong to fail to benefit someone. Benefits are presumptively good things,
but  they are also often trivial  good things for which we have no use.  Harms impair
essential conditions of human agency. Physical harms—death, disability, disease, and the
like—rob us of normal and foundational powers of action. Physical harm comes close to
being unconditionally bad.60 
49 Few benefits,  by contrast,  are unconditionally good.  Benefits  enhance lives, but their
power  to  do  so  usually  depends  greatly  on  the  details  of  the  life  in  question.
Extraordinary visual-spatial processing skills, for example, are of great value to football
quarterbacks and of little use to accountants. Unusually low levels of anxiety may be
indispensable to elite mountaineers and an impediment to a journalist who needs to take
a “do or die” attitude towards a deadline. Whether some benefit—great wealth, or great
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musical talent, or great athletic skill, or great mathematical brilliance, for example—plays
a valuable role in someone’s life depends heavily on her aspirations and projects. Even
great wealth is not an unalloyed good. Great wealth is necessary to major philanthropy,
but  it  may impair  the pursuit  of  authentic relationships.  Nor should the capacity of
wealth and its pursuit to get in the way of pursuing valuable ends be underestimated. It is
well-known that winning the lottery is anything but an unalloyed good.61 Being born rich
may undermine drive and achievement. 
50 Harms of the sort that concern us here and benefits stand in very different relation to
autonomy because they stand in very different relation to our wills. Harms compromise
our autonomy by impairing our normal powers of human agency. Benefits enhance our
lives  only  if  they are congruent  with our  wills.  To thrust  an unsought  benefit  upon
someone and demand compensation from them for the value conferred is to impose upon
them.62 Unsought benefits stand in the same relation to our wills  as harms do.  They
subject us to conditions which we have not chosen;  they sever the link between our
wishes, our wills and our lives and enlist us in other people’s projects. If I play beautiful
music outside your open bedroom window and then stick you with a bill for my services, I
determine the use to which you must put some of your time and some of your money. You
are presumptively entitled to determine those things and your ability to do so is  an
important aspect of your autonomy. 
 
2.3.2 Harm as impairment
51 The claims that  harms impair  autonomy—and that  the conferral  of  benefit  does  not
necessarily enhance autonomy—rest on conceptions of harm and benefit. The concept of
a benefit, for its part, is broad, straightforward and relatively uncontroversial. A benefit
is an advantage; something that promotes or enhances well-being.63 The philosophical
literature on “harm,” by contrast, is divided between dueling conceptions. It may be that
harm is not a unitary phenomenon. Be that as it may, the argument being developed here
draws on a conception of harm as a condition of impairment.64 In contrast to the more
prominent interest account of harm, the impairment account focuses on the condition or
state  itself,  not  on  its  relation  to  an  antecedent  or  alternative  condition.  Suffering
excruciating pain, for example, is harm—even if the alternative is death and even if you
prefer  agonizing  pain  to  death.  Core  harms  in  this  conception  are  conditions  of
impairment, conditions which compromise normal functioning. Blindness, for example, is
a harm because sight is a normal human power, a part of normal human functioning. This
is true even if the person in question is born blind and so never suffered the loss of sight
—never underwent any worsening of position. 
52 The concept  of  an  “impaired condition”  is  a  broad one.  Anything that  can function
normally can have its proper functioning impaired. You can harm a toy robot in this
sense, by breaking its motor. Harm in this broad sense need not impair autonomy; many
things that are not autonomous have functions that can be impaired. The core cases that
concern law and morality—cases such as physical disabilities, broken, deformed and lost
limbs, chronic pain and serious developmental disabilities—constitute a narrower set of
impaired  conditions.  Broken  bones,  severed  limbs,  disabilities  of  sight  and  hearing,
diseased organs and disfigured body parts all compromise the capacities through which
we act. Those capacities play central roles in normal human lives. When we are seriously
ill—or disabled or in serious pain—we are denied our normal lives. These core harms
compromise basic powers of normal human agency. They rob people of normal and essential
Principles of risk imposition and the priority of avoiding harm
Revus, 36 | 2018
16
powers through which they shape their lives and their worlds in accordance with their
wills.65 The will looms large here because it is at the center of our understanding and
experience of ourselves as agents. We draw upon our wills when we act and the exercise
of our wills makes us aware of our own persons as beings capable of bringing possibilities
into existence by choosing to do so. I can, for example, bring words into existence on a
page  by  typing  on  a  keyboard.  Physical  harms,  chronic  pain,  and  developmental
disabilities deprive us of normal forms of mastery over ourselves, our experience, and
some portions of the external world by driving a wedge between our wills and our lives.
They thrust upon us “conditions that generate a significant chasm” between our wills and
our experiences.66 
53  One point  in favor of  the “impaired condition” conception of  harm is  that  it  maps
remarkably well onto one of the basic features of that part of American tort law which
addresses  accidental  injury.  Tort  law  distinguishes  between  a  broad  conception  of
tortious wrongdoing as conduct, which invades “legally protected interests” (or rights),
and a narrower conception of physical harm as the suffering of an impaired condition.67
The First Restatement of Torts, for example, defined bodily harm as “any impairment of the
physical condition of another’s body or physical pain or illness.”68 The Second Restatement
refined this definition. “Bodily harm” was defined as “any physical impairment of the
condition of another’s body” and “an impairment of the physical condition of another’s
body [exists] if the structure or function of any part of the other’s body is altered.”69 The
Third Restatement now defines “physical harm” as “the physical impairment of the human
body  (‘bodily  harm’)  or  of  real  property  or  tangible  personal  property  ...  [such
impairment] includes physical injury, illness, disease, impairment of bodily function, and
death.”70 Serious physical impairment deprives people of normal lives, a point explicitly
recognized in statutes and cases. Michigan’s codification of the standard common law
rule in the automobile accident context,  for example,  defines “serious impairment of
bodily function” to mean “an objectively manifested impairment of an important body
function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.”71 A body
of case law grappling with the slowly unfolding consequences of exposure to asbestos
overwhelmingly  holds  that  identifiable  subclinical  damage  to  human  cells  will  not
support  a  tort  claim.  “The threat  of  future harm,  not  yet  realized,  is  not enough.”72
Functional impairment must be shown.73 Without such impairment there is no physical
harm even though there  are  very  real  financial  and psychological  costs  imposed by
subclinical cellular damage caused by exposure to asbestos.74 
54 Because physical capacities play central roles in normal human lives, physical harm is the
central  case  of  harm  under  the  impaired  condition  conception.75 Blindness  is,  for
example, serious harm because sight is a normal human capacity and its loss usually
diminishes a person’s life. Being blind denies someone access to an important range of
normal human activities. Other things equal, a person whose sight is normal has access to
a richer life than a blind person does. A broken leg is a serious harm because a person
whose leg is broken is unable to engage in a range of normal activities, beginning with
walking. Loss of a leg is a more serious harm than a broken leg, because loss of a leg is
permanent whereas a broken leg, properly treated, will heal.76 On an impaired-condition
conception,  then,  the gravity of  harm is  usually a function of  the importance to the
victim’s life of the capacity that the harm impairs and the duration of the impairment. 
55 When  harm  is  conceived  of  as  an  impaired  condition—and  physical  impairment  is
considered the core case—harm delineates a comparatively narrow domain of  special
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concern. Harm so conceived is much narrower than cost. Cost is any value given up in
order to obtain some good. It encompasses any disadvantage, anything which diminishes
well-being. Ordinary losses—athletic, financial and romantic—are costs, but not harms.77
Ordinary losses make their victims worse off than they would otherwise be, but they do
not leave their victims with permanent physical or psychological damage. The prospect of
loss to others does not usually give rise to strong reasons to avoid inflicting such loss. The
prospect of harm does. A person is, after all, at liberty to beat a competitor out for a job
by being better qualified, but she is not at liberty to break that competitor’s arm. In
competitive circumstances,  risk of  loss is  usually inseparable from the good that the
competition  seeks  to  realize.  Races  that  cannot  be  lost  are  not  worth  winning,  and
markets in which firms cannot fail do not realize the benefits of economic competition.
And, in sports, business and love, the risk of loss is accepted when the enterprise is taken
up. Losses suffered in these arenas cannot usually be counted as harms. This is so even
though it is not always worse to suffer harm than loss.  Most of us would rather,  for
instance, break our pinkies than see our business bankrupted by a competitor. The point
is that it is presumptively wrong to do harm, whereas it is not presumptively wrong to
inflict loss. It is not presumptively wrong for one businessman to drive another out of
business, fair and square, but it is presumptively wrong for one businessman to break
another’s  finger.  Absent  some  further  condition—such as  a  right  to,  or  a  legitimate
expectation of, some benefit—losses are not harms.78 
56 Harm’s  special  significance,  it  seems,  is  a  consequence  of  its  intimate  connection to
autonomy. There is nothing special about harm from an efficiency perspective; harms are
simply one kind of cost. Yet, harm does have special significance in our ordinary moral
thinking and in our law.  To understand harm’s special  significance,  we need to step
outside the framework of cost-benefit analysis and adopt a framework which takes our
separateness and independence as persons as fundamental, and which understands us as
agents who have a fundamental interest in authoring our own lives. Harm has special
significance because harms compromise our autonomy by impairing our normal powers
of human agency. Benefits, for their part, do not stand in the same relation to autonomy.
Benefits enhance our lives only if they are congruent with our commitments. Unsought
benefits  imposed  upon  us  diminish  our  autonomy  by  enlisting  us  in  other  people’s
projects. 
 
2.3.3 Tying the threads together
57 Taking the distinction between persons and the priority of avoiding harm seriously, and
situating them within the larger philosophical framework where they are at home, puts
us in a position to understand the logic at work in the safety and feasibility norms. 
58 The safety and feasibility norms speak to the problem of how to trade safety off against
other goods. They address the question of when some people are justified in imposing
risks of harm on others because they stand to benefit from so doing. The measure of their
success is whether they register the disproportionate importance of avoiding harm in a
persuasive way. When we consider significant risks of serious harm, fairness forbids the
unrestricted aggregation that is the hallmark of cost-benefit analysis. What it requires is
that we compare the gains to those who stand to gain to the burdens to those who stand
to lose.79 Some gains—some benefits—are not comparable to serious harms. When serious
harm is risked something of comparable importance must sit on the benefit side of the
scale. Not all benefits will do. An example of Scanlon’s brings this out.80 Scanlon supposes
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that a piece of transmitting equipment has toppled and pinned a television technician
helping to broadcast a live sporting event to which tens of millions of viewers are glued.
The technician is in agonizing pain and serious risk of further harm, including death. The
only way to save the technician’s life is to interrupt the broadcast for thirty minutes, by
which  time  game  may  have  ended.  Unrestricted  cost-benefit  analysis  holds  that,  if
enough  people  stand  to  be  disappointed  by  the  termination  of  a  television show,
terminating  the  life  of  a  television technician may be  preferable  to  terminating  the
broadcast of the show. The net benefit to all of the viewers (measured by what they would
be willing to pay to have the broadcast continue) might easily exceed the net loss to the
technician  (measured  by  what  he  would  be  willing  to pay  to  have  the  transmission
interrupted).
59 Our moral sensibility balks at the conclusion that net social benefit is dispositive in this
case. We take the distinction between persons seriously. Taking that distinction seriously
brings issues of interpersonal fairness to the fore. Although the number of viewers may
be vast, the harm to them is not morally comparable to the harm that the technician
stands to suffer. No amount of inconvenience and disappointment distributed across a
population of distinct persons sums to the moral equivalent of subjecting someone to
unendurable pain. Consequently, we should not decide how to proceed by measuring the
victim’s preference for having her agony alleviated in dollars and then comparing that
sum to the price that the viewers would pay to have the broadcast continue. The cost to
the technician and the benefit  to  the viewers  are  not  substitutable  at  some ratio  of
exchange. The benefit to the viewers is, comparatively speaking, trivial and the harm to
the technician is devastating. Aggregating harms and benefits does not make moral sense
when the harms and benefits are not comparable.
60 Health and physical integrity are kinds of primary goods.  Safety secures the physical
integrity  of  the  person  against  harm.  Values,  for  their  part,  are  plural  and
incommensurable. The point of protecting the essential conditions of agency for each
person is to enable people to shape their own lives in accordance with their aspirations.
Within a framework that prioritizes the protection of each person’s essential interests,
the attraction of the “safety” norm is evident enough. Just as efficient precaution is the
first-best standard of precaution for economic theory, the “safety” norm is the first-best
level standard of precaution for the contractualist form of liberalism we have invoked.
Safety, like health, is a precondition of effective agency and the best social world is a
social world which is safe for everyone. 
61 To be sure, we might think that the first-best social world is a world of “no risk”, not a
world in which “significant” risks have been eliminated but “insignificant” ones live on.
On plausible assumptions about the nature of our world, however, a world of “no risk” is
not a world worth having. So far as risk is concerned, our predicament is that liberty and
security  conflict.81 Perfect  safety  is  unattainable.  Risk  of  physical  harm—diminished
security—is the byproduct of action. Diminished liberty is the price of increased security.
We cannot farm, build, drive, fly, eat and drink, or mill cotton and refine benzene without
taking and imposing risks of devastating injury. Foregoing all activity would itself be a
short path to death, and even if death could somehow be avoided, foregoing all activity
would  cripple  the  pursuit  of  our  aims  and  aspirations  as  surely  and  severely  as
devastating physical injury does. A world in which no one moves is a world in which few,
if any, aims, ends, and aspirations can be realized, and few, if any, lives can be led. We
must therefore bear the level of risk that we might call the background level of risk.
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62 Background risks are worth bearing because eliminating them does even more harm to
our ability to lead the lives we wish to lead than bearing background risks does. This is
true  even  though  the  risks  are  sure  to  result  in  some  devastating  injuries.  The
background level of risk must be accepted despite the fact that level results in some
devastating injuries, because some risk of devastating injury is the price of activity and
activity is worth having. Without a “significance” requirement, one essential condition
for leading a worthwhile life—the freedom to act in the world—would be destroyed in the
name of another essential condition, namely, safety. The elimination of all discernible risk
requires the elimination of all discernible activity. And the elimination of all discernible
activity is a cure worse than the disease it treats.
63 If  this  broad  account  of  our  predicament  is  correct,  the  safety  norm  with  its
“significance” requirement is the first-best norm for the regulation of risk because it
secures for each person the lowest level of risk compatible with adequate freedom for the
pursuit of diverse ends and aspirations. The feasibility norm presents a more difficult
case. It sacrifices safety in order to secure some other good. In theory, health and safety
should only be sacrificed in order to promote some even more urgent interest. Within the
framework  sketched  by  this  paper,  trading  health  or  safety  off  against  other  goods
requires making judgments of urgency (or need) not preference (or want). Those who
demand more (or less) safety must show that their claims are more pressing than the
claims they purport to overcome. The feasibility norm discharges this responsibility by
embodying a general judgment of value, namely, that the continuation of the activity
responsible for the risks in question is more important than reduction of risk to the
“safe” level. The feasibility norm prescribes that risks should be reduced only to the point
where  further  reduction  would  jeopardize  the  long-run  survival  of  the  activity
responsible for the risks at issue. 
64 In the domain of its original formulation, the feasibility norm addressed basic industrial
activities (milling cotton, refining petroleum) that were taken to be so deeply embedded
in the economy that their elimination was unthinkable. The plausibility of the norm, in
this or any other application, depends on the persuasiveness of the judgment that the
value secured by the long-run flourishing of the activity in question is greater than the
value secured by reducing risk to the “safe” level is. The answer to that question depends
on the context at hand, and lies beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we can say only that
the measure of the feasibility norm’s success is whether, in some particular domain of its
application, it registers the priority of avoiding harm properly, and retreats from the
“safe level” of risk only in pursuit of some greater value. 
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426.
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unanimous Supreme Court held that the EPA “may not consider implementation costs” in setting
ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act. Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,
531 U.S. 457 (2001). Writing for the court, Justice Scalia observed: “Were it not for the hundreds
of pages of briefing respondents have submitted on the issue, one would have thought it fairly
clear that this text does not permit EPA to consider costs in setting standards [...] The EPA [...] is
to  identify  the  maximum  airborne  concentration  of  a  pollutant  that  the  public  health  can
tolerate,  decrease  the  concentration  to  provide  an  ‘adequate’  margin  of  safety,  and  set  the
standard  at  that  level.”  Id. at  465.  Entergy  Corp  v.  Riverkeeper,  Inc.,  556  U.S.  208  (2009)  may
represent a slight retreat from this position. See Cannon 2010. 
29. See e.g., Schwartz 1988; see also, Schwartz 1992.
30. Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 2001).
31. Keeton, Sargentich & Keating 2004: 975-76. See also, Green, 629 N.W.2d at 732 (summarizing the
facts of Ms. Green’s case).
32. The outcome under the risk-utility test depends greatly on whether that test is applied with
foresight or hindsight. The trend is to apply the test with foresight. For an example of a case with
virtually identical facts where the court refused to apply the expectation case and refused to
impose liability under the risk-utility test see Morson v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 4th 775 (2001).
33. Green, 629 N.W.2d at 735. 
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34. The  Green opinion  would  have  been better  if  the  court  had  discussed just  what  kind  of
expectation  was  disappointed  by  the  product  failure.  Not  every  consumer  expectation  is
reasonable.  On  the  one  hand,  some  expectations  are  mere  wishful  thinking.  It  would,  for
example, be wishful thinking to expect that no user would ever have an allergic reaction to a
product. Idiosyncratic reactions exist. A one-in-a-billion susceptibility to illness does not impugn
a product’s safety under the expectation test. We take the one-in-a-billion reaction to reflect a
rare sensitivity on the part of the victim. What’s surprising and disappointing about latex gloves
is that so many users (5 to 17 percent) suffer severe harm. On, the other hand, it asks too much to
expect  consumers  to  form  expectations  about  underlying  mechanisms  of  possible  product
malfunction. The Green court agreed with the defendant that “most consumers ... generally do
not  have  expectations  about  ...  technical  or  mechanical  design  aspects  of  the  product.”  It
disagreed over whether such expectations are necessary. What it found necessary was a secure
and reasonable expectation about product performance.
35. The term “statistical lives” was coined by Schelling 1984. Schelling distinguished statistical
lives from “identified” ones. Identified lives are actual persons who will live if certain steps are
taken and die if they are not. Statistical lives are abstract lives; they are the lives that will be
saved  down  the  road  if  some  precaution  is  taken,  or  some safety  program  is  implemented.
Statistical  lives  are  not  identifiable  at  the  time  a  precaution  is  taken,  and  may  remain
unidentifiable even after a precaution has been implemented and has saved lives. The term was
coined  by  Schelling,  but the  phenomenon  had  been  recognized  before  it  was  named.  See
Calabresi 1965.
36. The questions raised by the distinction between “statistical” and “identified” lives in the
rescue context are multiple and difficult.  For one thing,  if  we suppose that even the best of
precautions will not prevent all accidents, it may be eminently rational in even a cost-benefit
sense to commit ourselves in advance to rescue practices which look extravagant at the time we
undertake them. For another, contra Schelling, the distinction between identified and statistical
lives may make a major moral difference. Obligations may be owed to actual persons, but not to
theoretical constructs. See Frick 2015. These complexities are beyond the scope of this paper. 
37. Rescues give the question of appropriate precaution a particular posture. The question is not
what risk some people may impose on others, but what costs—including risks of death—rescuers
may reasonably take upon themselves to save the lives or others. The important common law
case Eckert v. Long Island RR has this posture. Here, too, the court’s analysis of whether the rescue
was prudent appears to be governed by a norm of possibility or feasibility. Eckert v. Long Island RR,
57 Barb. 555 (N.Y. 1870).
38. Caputo 1977: vii. I owe the Caputo example to MacLean 1994: 172. A more recent example can
be found in Black Hawk Down (book written by Mark Bowden in 1999,  film released in 2001).
During the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 the United States sent soldiers to rescue the crews of
downed  Black  Hawk  helicopters,  notwithstanding  the  enormous  risk  involved.  A  number  of
soldiers have been posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor—the highest military honor in the
United States—for sacrificing their own lives in such rescue attempts.
39. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). In Vincent, a ship was lashed to a
dock to avoid being cast out to sea in a storm. The ship’s otherwise trespassory entry onto the
plaintiff’s property was held to be privileged under the doctrine of necessity, but the privilege
was held to be conditional. Defendant was allowed to dock without permission but had to repair
the damage it did to the dock. 
40. Orthodox cost-benefit  analysis  embodies  the Kaldor-Hicks  or  potential  Pareto-superiority
criterion of efficiency. That criterion maximizes net benefit. See Adler 2007. 
41. The proposition that it is irrational to act in ways which do not maximize net benefit is a
piece of the thesis of Kaplow & Shavell 2002: xviii. They write “[u]nder any method of evaluating
social policy that accords positive weight to a notion of fairness, there must exist situations in
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which  all  individuals  will  be  made  worse  off.”  Maximizing  net  benefit  makes  it  possible  for
everyone to be better off than they would be in a world with less net value. There is more value
to go around. 
42. See  e.g. ,  Shuck 2002; Frank 2000 (noting that many find it “hard to imagine” that anyone
could  disagree  with  the  “commonsensical”  principle  that  we  should  take  only  those  actions
whose benefits exceed their costs). 
43. As has long been recognized. See Calabresi 1970: 205–08.
44. Schelling 1984: 113, 114, 115. See also, Schwartz 1991.
45. Id.
46. See Viscusi & Gayer 2016.
47. In the context of health and safety regulation, orthodox cost-benefit analysis recommends
monetizing all of the costs and all of the benefits of a regulation in order to compute net benefit.
Heterodox forms of  cost-benefit  analysis  make various  allowances  and adjustments.  See,  e.g., 
Adler & Posner 2006. 
48. Demsetz 1982: 44.
49. Kant 1785. In The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, Rawls explains that the priority of the basic
liberties rests in part on the premise that not all interests are fungible at some ratio of exchange.
RAWLS 2001.
50. See e.g., Calabresi  1970:  17  (listing the preservation of life “at all costs” as the first of four
“myths” that “will make our analysis difficult if not cleared up.”)
51. Scanlon 1998: 106. 
52. See Schelling 1984: 113, 114, 115.
53. This, of course, is a longstanding criticism of utilitarianism, the parent philosophy of cost-
benefit analysis. See Rawls 1999: 24. 
54. See generally, Ripstein 2016.
55. Nozick 1974: 54-87.
56. See Kumar 2012.
57. Broome 1991: 94–95. See also, Frick 2015. See also, Waisman 2014; Simons 2008. 
58. Gordon 1992: 451.
59. Gordon 1992: 451. 
60. In some cases, the physical harm suffered may avoid a greater physical harm. In others, the
harm may enable the realization of some value or good to whose realization the harmed person
is deeply committed. These are exceptional cases, however, and even in these cases the harm
suffered  is  still,  in  itself,  bad.  A  broken  arm  may  be  worth  suffering  if  it  avoids  death  by
drowning, but it is still a harm. 
61. See, e.g., Brickman 1978.
62. See, e.g., Fennell 2014 (discussing forced ownership of property by the government). 
63. See, Shiffrin 2012. 
64. Preeminently, this conception is advanced by Thomson 1990: 262–68, and by Shiffrin 2012. See
also Thomson 2011. A third conception of harm, championed by Matthew Hanser, takes harms to
be events that injure basic human goods, not the ensuing conditions of impairment. Basic goods
are “those goods [the] possession of which makes possible the achievement of a wide variety of
the potential components of a reasonably happy life […] [The] basic goods [...] include certain
fairly general physical and mental powers and abilities. The power of sight, for example, is a
basic good for human beings.” Hanser 2008: 440–41.
65. See Shiffrin 2012: 383. In sharpening the concept of harm in this way Shiffrin is, in part,
criticizing Raz’s conception as too broad. See Shiffrin 2012: 389, n. 48. By contrast, she is further
articulating  Thomson’s  conception,  though  Thomson  might  not  accept  the  sharpening.  See
Thomson 1990: 227–48, 250–51, 253–71; Thomson 2011. 
Principles of risk imposition and the priority of avoiding harm
Revus, 36 | 2018
27
66. Shiffrin 1999.
67. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 7, 15 (1965). 
68. Restatement (First) of Torts § 15 (1934).
69. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 15 cmt.  a (1965).  Section 7 distinguishes “bodily harm” from
“injury” with “injury” covering cases in which a “legally protected interest” is invaded, but no
harm is done. A harmless trespass would be an injury in this sense. Id. at § 7.
70. Restatement  (Third)  of  Torts:  Liability  for  Physical  &  Emotional  Harm §  4  (2010).  The  Third
Restatement extends the idea of harm as an impaired condition to include the impairment of
property. The philosophical conception of harm is concerned only with harm to persons. The
question of how to account for the importance of property damage to tort is peripheral to the
concerns of this paper. Offhand, the easiest way to make the extension would appear to be to
draw upon the fact that we have rights in property.  Those rights give rise to claims against
others that they not damage our property, and make impairment of our property a harm to us. 
71. MCL 500.3135(1) (“A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by
his or her ownership,  maintenance,  or use of a motor vehicle only if  the injured person has
suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.”). A
recent Michigan Supreme Court case, McCormick v. Carrier, 795 N.W.2d 517 (Mich. 2010), applies
this concept of impairment in an instructive manner. Plaintiff’s foot was broken and bruised
when defendant’s truck ran it over. The foot healed, though it continued to ache occasionally.
With the healed foot the plaintiff could perform the same work he performed prior to the injury
but the post-injury foot hampered his fishing and other recreational activities. The court found
impairment because plaintiff’s ability to lead his normal life was adversely affected. 
72. Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp, 752 P.2d 28, 30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Prosser & Keeton
1984: 165, § 30). Pleural thickening, a condition in which the lining of the lung thickens, may be
the most common form of cellular damage which does not, by itself, count as physical harm.
Because the harms of asbestos exposure are progressive, pleural thickening is a harbinger of
asbestosis and mesothelioma.
73. In addition to Burns, id., illustrative decisions include Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 604 A.2d
47 (Md. Ct. App. 1992); In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F.Supp. 1563 (D. Haw. 1990). Verbryke
v.  Owens-Corning Fiberglas  Corp.,  84 Ohio App.3d 388 (1992)  holds that  pleural  thickening does
constitute bodily harm, but it is abrogated by Ackison v. Anchor Packing Company, 120 Ohio St.3d
228 (2008).
74. Medical monitoring costs, for example, are very likely to be incurred if a patient presents
with subclinical damage from asbestos. The psychic costs are even larger. Persons afflicted by
such changes live under swords of Damocles that are beginning to drop. This is a real and serious
psychic burden, as the U.S. Supreme Court notes in Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 150
(2003) (“In the course of the 20th century, courts sustained a variety of other ‘fear-of’ claims.
Among them have been claims for fear of cancer. Heightened vulnerability to cancer [...] must
necessarily have a most depressing effect upon the injured person. Like the sword of Damocles,
he knows it is there, but not whether or when it will fall.”) (Internal quotations and citations
omitted).
75. Psychological harm follows not far behind. Impaired psychological capacities wreak similar
havoc with normal lives. Child sexual abuse, for instance, usually leads to serious harm because it
usually damages the capacity to trust other people and so impairs the formation of normal and
valuable human relationships. Disfigurement is, intuitively, a core case of harm, but not an easy
case to explain. The role of normal human appearance in social relations probably explains the
importance of disfigurement as a harm. Goffman 1963: 41–104.
76. In Davis v. Consolidated Rail, 788 F.2d 1260 (1986), Judge Posner remarks that “the loss of a leg is
a terrible disfigurement, especially for a young man” even if the victim “is able to walk with the
aid of prosthetic devices, to drive, to work, and in short to lead almost a normal life.” Precisely
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because the idea of harm as impairment is not a part of the economic theory to which Judge
Posner subscribes, this appeal to ideas of disability and disfigurement is revealing. Id. at 1263.
77. Influential psychological research by Daniel Kahneman and others has shown that people’s
ordinary judgments about gains and losses violate the prescriptions of expected utility theory
because  people  treat  financial  losses  and gains  differently.  See  Kahneman 1991.  There  is  an
obvious resemblance between the asymmetry of harm and benefit in law and morality and the
asymmetry of gain and loss in observed human behavior. It is therefore tempting to regard the
harm-benefit asymmetry as an instance of a more general psychological aversion to loss. That
temptation should be avoided. The two asymmetries are importantly different. Harms generally
result  in impaired conditions whereas losses generally  do not.  Moreover,  insofar as the take
home lesson of the psychological research is that people make irrational judgments, that lesson
is at odds with the argument developed here. The argument developed here is that people have
good reasons—rooted in considerations of autonomy— to treat harms and benefits differently. 
78. See Fennell 2014, and accompanying text. 
79. This involves evaluating risk impositions from “representative standpoints” and considering
the  “generic  reasons”  relevant  to  those  standpoints.  See Kumar  2015a  and  2015b.  The
presumptively relevant standpoints are the standpoints of potential injurers and victims. Often
these standpoints must be revised and refined to analyze a particular circumstance well. 
80. See Scanlon 1998: 235.
81. For these purposes, liberty is the freedom to impose risk on others and security freedom from
harm arising out of risk imposed on us by others. 
ABSTRACTS
Standards  which  prescribe  more  than efficient  precaution  against  physical  harm and health
injury are commonplace in American environmental,  health and safety regulation.  Yet  these
standards are now routinely decried as irrational. Welfare, we are told, is the ultimate and only
value and it prescribes efficient precaution. This paper argues that, in both law and ordinary
moral  reasoning,  the  avoidance  of  harm  has  priority  over  the  provision  of  benefit.  Harm
avoidance has a justified priority but that priority is rooted in the value of autonomy, not in the
value of well-being. Serious physical harms impair the pursuit of a wide range of human ends and
aspirations, and deny normal human lives to those whose powers are impaired. Only some gains
and  some  values  are  important  enough  to  justify  the  imposition  of  “significant  risk”  of
devastating physical injury. The judgment here is not one of cost and benefit, but of comparable
value.
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